As described in the previous section, the German implementation challenge consists of two components. The first is that the obvious tools of conceptual engineers are ineffective when it comes to changing semantic meaning. The second is that we are not in a position to know what is needed to change the semantic meaning. The German argues that conceptual engineers bear the burden of proof: Whoever wants to revise semantic meanings, „reports to us how they can actually do it” (p. 7). Below, I will describe such a report, defend against the objections of German and show that it makes conceptual engineering feasible. My first objection to German is that this construction of options is a false dichotomy. It is not as if we can either change semantic meanings or be content with the importance of spokespeople at the individual level. There is room for a plausible, achievable and non-trivial project between the two, namely to convince other members of their own group to use an existing term in a new way. In many areas of philosophy and in academic disciplines in general, it is important that participants in a debate „speak the same language.” The fact that their notions have similar or identical semantic meanings is not enough.
It is also important that their communication intentions are coordinated in the right way. In other words, it is important for debate participants to understand what others intend to communicate when using certain expressions. The process of mutual understanding is greatly facilitated when participants share their communication intentions. Since some speakers are less supportive than others of successful philosophical or academic work – a hypothesis that conceptual engineers typically make and which is discussed below – the project to improve what a group of researchers with its key concepts means becomes both edifying and important. For this reason, the narrative construction of conceptual re-engineering does not need to have the mundane tendencies affirmed by German. Footnote 4 I will show below that the German dilemma for conceptual technique does not arise. For two reasons, I will focus primarily on conceptual re-engineering. First, it is the kind of conceptual technique that most contemporary discussions focus on. Secondly, I partly agree with German that conceptual construction is less new and less exciting than conceptual renovation.